The purpose of this study is to examine dynamic interdependence between economic development, wealth and income distributions, and discrimination in an integrated Walrasian-general-equilibrium and neoclassical-growth 
INTRODUCTION
Discrimination is conducted against different people in different forms over human history in different parts of the world. For instance, slavery had been conducted over a long period in the United States. After the end of slavery, 
The Capital Goods Sector
We use the widely applied Cobb-Douglas production function in the literature of economic growth research (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990; Jones, 1995; Blanchard, 1997; Gollin, 2002; Hájková and Hurník, 2007) 
Consumer Goods Sector
The production function of the consumer goods sector is       
The marginal conditions are
where   t p is the price of consumer goods. Zhang (1993) proposed an alternative approach to describe behavior of households. This study applies this approach.
Consumer Behaviors and Wealth Dynamics
We assume that the economic effect of discrimination is transfer of money between groups. A simple case of income transfer between two types of households due to government taxation is modeled in Zhang (2005) . This study is influenced by Zhang's modeling of income transfers.
We consider that the preference for current and future consumption is described by the consumer's preference structure over leisure time, consumption and saving. Let per capita wealth of group j by denoted by  . 
We assume that discrimination is conducted against wage income, wealth, and consumer goods markets. For simplicity, we neglect possibilities of any discrimination against interest income from wealth. We also neglect possibilities that a group discriminates some © 2017 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved. other groups and at the same time is discriminated by some other groups. Per capita current disposable income from the interest payment    , 
The disposable income is spent on saving and consuming. It is straightforward to see that we can treat the value, 
We use   t T j to stand for the leisure time at time t and 0 T the (fixed) available time for work and leisure. The time constraint is given by 
where we use j 0  to denote the propensity to use leisure time, j 0  the propensity to consume consumption goods, and j 0  propensity to save. Although there are some growth models of heterogeneous households, the heterogeneity in most of these studies assumed to come from differences in initial endowments (e.g., (Chatterjee, 1994; Caselli and Ventura, 2000; Maliar and Maliar, 2001; Penalosa and Turnovsky, 2006; Turnovsky and Penalosa, 2006) ). Households should be considered essentially homogeneous because they all have the same preference utility function. Our study considers that heterogeneous households have different utility functions.
Maximizing the utility subject to (10) yields There are models which explicitly address relationships between the labor-leisure choice and portfolio and consumption decisions (e.g., (Bodie, 1992; Dessing, 2002; Bodie et al., 2004; Farhi and Panageas, 2007; Heijdra and Romp, 2009; Martín, 2010; Kim et al., 2014) ). Our model also determines a relationship between wealth and work time.
We will discuss the relationship when simulating the model. We now describe wealth dynamics. The change in wealth is equal to the saving minus dissaving. As the saving is   t s j and dissaving is equal to  , t k j the change in the household's wealth is
Demand and Supply
The demand for and supply of consumer goods are equal. We have
As the output of the capital goods sector equals the depreciation of capital stock and the net saving, we have
where
Capital Being Fully Utilized
As   t K is fully employed by the two sectors, we have
The Balance in Transfers between the Groups Due To Discrimination
The total income from discrimination is the sum of the total income   
The total income from discrimination is distributed between the discriminating groups 
This assumption simplifies our analysis as if we consider that the lump sum transfers vary between groups, we need further distribution mechanisms for deciding distribution issues. From the definition, we have
We completed the model. As far as economic structure and growth theory with endogenous capital are concerned, this is a very general model in the sense that it is based on some well-known models in economics. The Walrasian general equilibrium theory shows how to describe equilibrium of different economic forces for given capital. The Solow growth model and the Uzawa two-sector model show the ways to describe endogenous capital accumulation growth and economic structures over time. If the economic system has only two sectors, then the Walrasian general equilibrium theory (which treats capital exogenous) can be considered as a special case of our model with heterogeneous households with endogenous leisure time and wealth. It is straightforward to see that the Solow-one sector and the Uzawa two sector model are special cases of our model. As our model also includes labor supply, it is closely related with some other growth models in the literature of, for instance, labor economics. We now examine behavior of the economic system.
64
© 2017 AESS Publications. All Rights Reserved.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY AND THE DYNAMIC PROPERTIES
We built an economic system with any number of groups of the population. Each group may have any number of households. As the population of each group is homogenous and the propensities to save vary between groups, it is reasonable to expect that the dimension of the dynamic is equal to the number of groups. We confirm this by the following lemma. The lemma also provides a computational procedure for calculating all the variables at any point in time.
Before representing our result, we use a new variable  
The motion of the economic system is determined by J differential equations with   t z and 
This lemma is important as it is straightforward for us to apply the procedure to simulate the motion of the economic system. Calibration of general equilibrium is mathematically not easy as it often involves solving high-dimensional nonlinear equations. For instance, when studying behavior of the Walrasian general equilibrium the final stage of analysis is to find a price vector at which excess demand is zero (Judd, 1998) . Different methods for calculating equilibria are developed in mathematical economics (e.g., (Scarf, 1967; Scarf and Hansen, 1973) ). As our model is mathematically similar to the general equilibrium model at any point in time, it is possible for us to apply these traditional methods to find how the prices and other variables are related to the variables in the differential equations. We now simulate the model with 3 groups of the population to illustrate properties of the system. We specify the values of parameters as follows . 
The population of group 2 is largest, while the population of group 3 is the next. The human capital level of group 1 is highest, while the human capital level of group 3 is lowest. The capital goods sector and consumer goods (Miles and Scott, 2005; Abel et al., 2007) propensity is between the other two groups. The discriminator's discrimination rates against the discriminated group are mild. The discrimination rates on consumption, wage income and wealth are all fixed at 5 percent. We specify the initial conditions as follows
The motion of the variables is plotted in Figure 1 . The output level of the capital goods sector rises over time and the output level of the consumer goods sector falls. The price of consumer goods changes slightly. The national output falls as the falling in the value of the capital goods sector's output is larger than the rising in the value of the consumer goods sector's output. The wage rates of the three groups vary slightly over time. The discriminator's wage rate is higher than the neutral group's, and the neutral group's wage rate is higher than the discriminated group's. The discriminator gets increasingly more money from discriminating. The discriminator works less hours and the discriminated group works more hours over time. The neutral group works more hours over time. The net impact on the total labor supply is that the labor supply falls over time. The consumer goods sector's labor force is reduced, and the capital goods sector's labor force is augmented slightly. The total capital and the capital input of the consumer goods sector are reduced slightly, and the capital input of the capital goods sector is increased. The rate of interest falls. The discriminator's and discriminated group's wealth levels are increased, the neutral group's wealth is diminished. The discriminator's and the discriminated group's consumption levels are increased. The neutral group's consumption level is diminished. It should be noted that there are empirical studies which find negative relationships between wealth and labor supply (for instance, (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Cheng and French, 2000; Coronado and Perozek, 2003) ). As demonstrated in our simulation, one finds positive relationship for some groups and negative for other groups. Another well-discussed issue is the relations between wealth and income distribution and growth. Kaldor (1956) argues that as income inequality is enlarged, growth should be encouraged as savings are promoted. Positive relations between income inequality and growth are identified in some studies (e.g., (Bourguignon, 1981; Forbes, 2000; Frank, 2009 )), while negative relations by some other studies (e.g., (Solow, 1992; Galor and Zeira, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Benabou, 2002; Galor and Moav, 2004) ). From our simulation, we see that relations between inequality and economic growth are complicated in the sense that these relations are determined by many factors. For instance, as the economy experiences negative growth rate, the discriminator works less hours and the other two groups work more hours. As the wage rates are almost not affected, the wage incomes between the groups are either enlarged or reduced. We can also see different relations between wealth inequalities and economic growth.
Figure-1. The Motion of the Economic System
It is straightforward to confirm that the variables become stationary in the long term. 
We calculate the three eigenvalues as follows  .
We see that the system has a unique equilibrium with real negative eigenvalues. This result is important as we can effectively conduct comparative dynamic analysis.
COMPARATIVE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
We plotted the motion of the economy with three groups and fixed discrimination rates. We now ask what will happen to the three groups if the discriminator changes its discrimination rates against the discriminated group. As the lemma in section 3 provides the computational procedure to calibrate the motion of all the variables, it is straightforward to examine effects of change in any parameter on transitory processes as well stationary states of all the variables. We 
The Discrimination Rate on Wage Income Being Increased
First, we examine the case that the discriminator increases the discrimination rate on wage income in the following way:
The simulation results are given in Figure . 2 As more wage income is transferred from the discriminated group to the discriminator, the lump sum transfer is increased. The wage rates, the price, and the rate of reduced. The discriminated group's consumption and wealth levels are reduced, the discriminator's consumption and wealth levels are increased, and the neutral group's consumption and wealth levels are almost not changed. Although the effects on the discriminating and discriminated groups are expectable, the strengthened discrimination has almost no impact the neutral group. 
The Discrimination Rate on Wealth Being Increased
We now study the case that the discriminator increases the discrimination rate on wealth as follows:
The simulation results are given in Figure . 3 Like in the previous case, the lump sum transfer is increased. The wage rates are increased, while the price of consumer goods and the rate of interest are reduced. The discriminator's work time is reduced, the discriminated group's work time is increased, and the neutral group's work time is slightly affected. The total labor supply, national wealth and national output are reduced. The levels of the capital goods sector's two input factors are increased and the levels of the consumer goods sector's two input factors are reduced. The output level of the capital goods sector is increased, while the output level of the consumer goods is reduced. The discriminated group's consumption and wealth levels are reduced, the discriminator's consumption and wealth levels are increased, and the neutral group's consumption and wealth levels are slightly affected. Like in the previous case, the strengthened discrimination has almost no impact on the neutral group. 
The Discrimination Rate on Consumption Being Increased
We now analyze what will happen to the economic system when the discriminator increases the discrimination rate on consumption in the following way.
The simulation results are given in Figure . 4 We see that the effects are similar to the effects of the strengthened discrimination in wealth or wage income. It should be noted that the strengthened discrimination on consumption has also almost no impact the neutral group.
Figure-4. A Rise in the Discrimination Rate on Consumption

Strengthened Discrimination Associated with Positive Reaction of the Discriminated
We analyzed the effects of changes in a single parameter on the economic system. However, it is possible that many exogenous conditions are varied at the same time. For instance, when discriminating groups change attitudes toward discriminated groups, the discriminated groups may change their behavior and preferences. For instance, it is possible that when a group is more strongly discriminated, it may make more investment in education and save more. We may also have the opposite reaction. We now examine what happens to the economic system when the discriminator strengthens its discrimination against the discriminated group and the discriminated group "positively" reacts the strengthened discrimination by reducing its propensity to use leisure time, increasing its propensity to save, and enhancing its human 
The discriminator increases its three discrimination rates. In reaction the discriminated group increases its human capital and propensity to save and reduces its propensity to enjoy leisure. The simulation results are given in Figure . 5
We see that the aggregated real variables are all increased. The national output, the national wealth, the total labor supply, and the output levels and the input factors of the two sectors are all increased. The lump sum transfer from the discriminated group to the discriminator is increased. The discriminated group's wage rate is augmented and the other two groups' wage rates are almost not affected. The price of consumer goods falls. The rate of interest is decreased.
The discriminator's work time is reduced, the discriminated group's work time is increased, and the neutral group's work time is slightly affected. The discriminated group's and the discriminator's consumption and wealth levels are increased, and the neutral group's consumption and wealth levels are slightly affected. It should be emphasized that like in the previous cases the exogenous changes in discrimination have almost no impact on the neutral group's wage rate, the work time, and per capita levels of consumption and wealth. It should be noted that we assume "positive" reaction against discrimination. In reality we perhaps find the opposite trends. If the discriminated people react negatively, we should expect more negative economic consequences of discrimination. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposed a growth model of heterogeneous households with economic structure and discrimination. The
Walrasian general equilibrium supplies us the framework to describe consumption decision and income and wealth distribution. The neoclassical growth theory shows the determinants of capital accumulation. It is also strongly affected by the general equilibrium models by Zhang (2014) . The main differences are that this study introduced discrimination, while in Zhang's models there is no discrimination in the economic system. We were mainly concerned with the role of discrimination in economic growth, income and wealth distribution in an economy with endogenous wealth accumulation.
The economy has two production sectors, one capital goods sector and another one consumer goods sector. The system has any number of groups of households. We built the model in which wealth accumulation, income and wealth distribution, time distribution and division of labor interact with each other under a fixed pattern of discrimination. We found the computational differential equations which describe the motion of the economic system. For illustration, we simulated the motion of the economic system with three groups of households, called the discriminator, the neutral group, and the discriminated group. The calibrated model has a unique stable equilibrium point. Comparative dynamic analysis was conducted to examine the impact of changes in different parameters on the transitory process and long-term equilibrium point. We discussed implications of discrimination for the relations between work time and wealth and the relations between wealth and income distribution and economic growth. For instance, we show that when the discriminator strengthens its discrimination against the discriminated group and the discriminated group "positively" reacts the strengthened discrimination by reducing its propensity to use leisure time, increasing its propensity to save, and enhancing its human capital, we have the following effects: the national output, the national wealth, the total labor supply, and the output levels and the input factors of the two sectors are all increased; the lump sum transfer from the discriminated group to the discriminator is increased; the discriminated group's wage rate is augmented and the other two groups' wage rates are almost not affected; the price of consumer goods and the rate of interest are lowered; the discriminator's work time is reduced, the discriminated group's work time is increased, and the neutral group's work time is slightly affected; the discriminated group's and the discriminator's consumption and wealth levels are increased, and the neutral group's consumption and wealth levels are slightly affected. Another interesting conclusion from the comparative dynamic analysis is that the exogenous changes in the discriminator's discrimination against the discriminated group have almost no impact the neutral group's wage rate, the work time, and per capita levels of consumption and wealth. This conclusion implies that as far as its economic self-interest is concerned, under certain conditions the neutral group has almost no incentive to join the discriminated group to be against the discriminator's discrimination. It should be noted that our simulation are limited cases of actual complexity of discrimination. In reality people even from the same group may react quietly differently towards the same discrimination according to their psychological, economic, and social conditions. Another important issue is to make discrimination endogenous variables. Further studies on endogenous discrimination should provide more insights into complexity of interrelations of different races and groups over time.
Appendix: Proving the Lemma
From (4) and (6), we get , / s s (4) , ,
The rate of interest and the wage rates are presented as functions of . 
